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Abstract
Wemodel an urban labour market in a developing economy, incorporating workers’
risk attitudes. Trade-offs between risk aversion and ability determine worker allocation
across formal and informal wage employment, and voluntary and involuntary self
employment. Greater risk of informal wage non-payment can raise or lower informal
wage employment, depending on the source of risk. Informal wage employment can
be reduced by increasing detection efforts or by strengthening contract enforcement
for informal wage payment. As the average ability of workers rises, informal wage
employment first rises, then falls. Greater demand for formal production may lead to
more involuntary self employment.
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1 Introduction
In developing economies the majority of urban employment is informal (OECD 2009),
and whether as wage- or self-employment, informality can involve significant risks for
the worker. Informal workers have little social protection and relatively volatile earnings,
while microfirms have a high rate of failure (Perry et al. 2007; Günther and Launov 2012).
An absence of legal protection by the police or courts may leave workers at risk of being
cheated (Deshingkar and Akter 2009). Lack of application of health and safety regulations
may expose both informal workers and the self employed to significant health risks, and
the growth of informality is associated with a greater incidence of depression and stress-
related illnesses (World Bank 2012).
However, in virtually all of the theoretical literature on labour market informality in
developing economies, workers are either assumed to be risk-neutral or risk is disregarded
altogether. In the seminal paper by Rauch (1991), which is an adaptation of the Lucas
(1978) formulation of firm size-distribution to informal labour markets, the focus is on
the heterogeneity of agents’ (entrepreneurial) ability, but there is no allowance for risk
aversion.1 In the informality literature based on search-and-matching theory the risk of
not being able to find a job is a central feature, but workers are assumed risk neutral (see,
e.g., Zenou 2008; Albrecht et al. 2009).
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The present paper contributes to the Lucas-Rauch branch of the literature by intro-
ducing risk aversion. We allow for uncertainty of earnings and we assume that workers,
who are heterogeneous, are characterized in two dimensions – risk aversion and abil-
ity. In our model, a worker can be in one of three labour market states – formal
wage employment, informal wage employment or self-employment. We assume that
formal wage employment gives a certain income, but the other two states generate
uncertain income, with the uncertainty being greater (in a sense that we specify) for
self-employment than for informal wage employment.2 The formal wage is assumed to
exceed the maximum possible level of the informal wage. Ability is assumed to affect
earnings in self-employment, but not in either type of wage employment. We take the
demand side of the labour market as given, with downward-sloping demand functions
for each type of labour, and we focus on the supply of labour to the three types of
work.
The great majority of urban self-employment in developing economies can be classi-
fied as informal. In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, according to Perry
et al. (2007), 26.58% of urban workers are self-employed (Perry et al. use the term ‘inde-
pendent’), of whom 23.64% are ‘informal’ and only 2.94% are ‘professionals’. We may
therefore regard all self employment (or at least involuntary self employment) as infor-
mal in our model.3 As specified by Rauch (1991) and much of the ensuing literature on
informality, we assume that the wage rate in the formal sector is fixed above the market-
clearing level. This might be because of a minimum wage law or union activity; it might
be an implicit representation of social security benefit provision; or it might be because
formal firms are relatively large, so that monitoring of workers is difficult and employers
choose to pay an efficiency wage to deal with moral hazard.
The model is formulated in Section 2. Workers may differ with respect to risk aversion
and ability, though each has constant relative risk aversion. Each individual worker may,
in principle, gain formal wage employment, informal wage employment or self employ-
ment. Because the latter two types of employment yield uncertain income, we specify
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility. Because the formal wage rate is set above the market-
clearing level, there is rationing of formal jobs and so not all workers who prefer formal
employment will achieve it. For each worker we specify the first preference among the
three employment states as a function of risk attitude and ability. Under our assump-
tions informal wage work can never be a first preference. However, formal wage jobs
are rationed, and so some of the workers whose first preference is formal wage employ-
ment are forced to turn to other work. For these workers we specify a second preference,
which can only be for self employment or informal wage employment. Again, we spec-
ify this choice as a function of risk attitude and ability. Self employment here is defined
as ‘involuntary’, whereas self-employment as a first choice is defined as ‘voluntary’.4
Worker preferences across risk attitude and ability characteristics are illustrated
diagrammatically.
In Section 3, assuming that the informal wage rate is market-clearing, we specify condi-
tions for the existence of equilibrium and we illustrate the equilibrium by reinterpreting
the diagram formulated in Section 2. We then derive and discuss the comparative statics
of the model, examining the effects on the labour market of several policy changes and of
some simple representations of economic development. Section 4 concludes, and proofs
are given in an appendix.
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2 Themodel
2.1 Employment
We consider a population of workers, each of whom is characterized in terms of two
parameters, relative risk aversion γ ∈[ 0, 1) and ability ρ ∈ [1, ρ]. Each has a utility
function of the form5
u (y) = y
1−γ
1 − γ , (1)
where y denotes income. There are three types of employment: formal wage employment,
informal wage employment and self-employment, which are denoted by the respective
subscripts E = (F , I, S). A worker cannot engage in more than one type of employment
simultaneously. Income y is assumed to be certain in formal wage employment, but uncer-
tain in informal wage employment and self-employment. Ability ρ is assumed only to
affect income y in self-employment.
If a worker is employed in a formal job, income y = wF > 0 with certainty. If employed
informally, y = wI , where 0 < wI < wF , with probability 1−φ, and zero with probability φ,
where φ ∈ (0, 1). The potential zero income is a normalization to simplify the exposition.
However, if a worker is self employed, ability ρ may affect income. Income y is then ρ with
probability 1− ψ , and zero with probability ψ , where ψ ∈ (0, 1). We can interpret ability
ρ as the number of efficiency units of labour that a worker would supply if self-employed.
This implicitly sets the wage rate for self-employment as the numéraire., and it implies
that wF and wI are wage rates relative to the implicit self-employment wage rate. Von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility vE (E = F , I, S) in each of the three types of employment
is therefore
vF = u(wF); vI = (1 − φ)u(wI); vS = (1 − ψ)u(ρ). (2)
To capture the idea that self-employment is riskier than informal wage employment,
we consider a person whose ability ρ is such that mean income is the same for S as for
I: (1 − φ)wI = (1 − ψ) ρ. Writing VarE for the variance of income in employment E =
(F , I, S), we have
VarI = φw2I (1 − φ) ; VarS = ρ2ψ(1 − ψ).
Therefore, if (1 − φ)wI = (1 − ψ)ρ, then VarS > VarI if and only if ψ/ (1 − ψ) >
φ/ (1 − φ), which holds if and only if ψ > φ. We shall assume this condition to hold
throughout.
2.2 Labour demand
Labour demand is formulated as simply as possible, with linear downward sloping curves.
Since the implicit wage rate for self-employed labour is the numéraire, we need only for-
mulate behaviour in the formal and informal wage labour markets; by Walras’ Law, this
will also give us equilibrium in the market for self-employed labour. We therefore only
consider labour demand in the two wage labour markets. It is assumed that employers are
risk-neutral.
In the informal wage labour market, labour demand will depend on the form of the
uncertainty that obtains. Suppose first that the ‘discovery’ that a firm is employing work-
ers informally leads to the confiscation of all revenue and the nonpayment of any wages
with probability φc. Then marginal cost and marginal revenue are both reduced for the
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employer by the proportion φc, so that the risk of discovery has no effect on labour
demand. Alternatively, suppose the risk for the worker is that the employer will disappear
without paying any wages. If the probability of this happening is φd, the effective wage
rate for the employer is (1 − φd)wI . By writing φc + φd = φ we accommodate both of
these types of uncertainty.
Denoting the aggregate demand for labour of employment type E by LdE (E = F , I, S), we
can therefore write
LdF = AF − wF ; (3)
LdI = AI − (1 − φd)wI ; (4)
where AF and AI are positive constants.
2.3 Labour supply
We shall assume that the formal wage rate wF is fixed above the market-clearing level. As
a result, there will be rationing of formal wage jobs. First we characterize workers’ first
preferences among E = F , I, S. Then, for workers whose first preference is E = F , and
whomay therefore find that they cannot achieve their first preference, we consider second
preferences.
2.3.1 First preferences
We wish to determine the first preference among E = F , I, S for any worker with
characteristics (γ , ρ). The first choice sets are given by
WF : vF > max (vI , vS) ; (5)
WI : vI > max (vF , vS) ; (6)
WS : vS > max (vF , vI) ; (7)
whereWE denotes the set of workers whose first preference is E (E = F , I, S).
As wF > wI , φ ≥ 0 and γ ∈[ 0, 1), it follows that vF > vI , and hence WI = ∅: E =
I can never be a first preference. Using (2), we can determine the borderline values of
parameters underlying (5) and (7):
vF ≷ vS ⇔ α ≶ g(γ ), (8)
where α ≡ log ρ and
g(γ ) = logwF − log(1 − ψ)1 − γ . (9)
Formal employment is preferred to self employment by workers with a combination of
a sufficiently low level of ability and a sufficiently great level of risk aversion. Note that
g(γ ) may take either sign.
We assume a bivariate uniform distribution for log ability, α, and risk aversion, γ , across
workers. Since ρ ∈ [1, ρ], we have that α ∈[ 0,α], where α ≡ log ρ. Given that γ ∈[ 0, 1),
the probability density function is
f (α, γ ) = 1
α
.
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The proportions of workers whose first preferences are formal wage employment and
self employment are, respectively,
|WS| =
∫ g−1(α)
0
∫ α
max(0,g(γ ))
f (α, γ ) dα dγ ;
|WF | = 1 − |WS| .
(10)
The expression for |WS| gives the proportion preferring self employment over levels of
risk aversion γ up to the critical level g−1(α) and for log ability at or above the critical
level g(γ ). The remaining portion of the population of workers are in set WF , preferring
formal wage employment.
These preferences are illustrated in Figure 1, where log ability α is measured on the hor-
izontal axis and risk aversion γ on the vertical axis. The borderline combinations of (α, γ )
at which a worker is indifferent between formal wage employment and self employment
are shown by the upward-sloping line.6 Self-employment is preferred by workers with a
combination of relatively low risk aversion and relatively high ability. Starting at a border-
line combination of (α, γ ), an incremental increase in risk aversion makes a worker prefer
formal wage employment, but a large enough increase in log ability brings the worker
back to indifference. However, as the initial level of γ is increased, risk aversion becoming
more intense, the required compensatory increase in log ability becomes greater.
The figure is drawn on the assumption that the configuration of parameter values is
such that both formal wage employment and self employment are each preferred by
someone. The condition underlying this assumption is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. WF is always non-empty; WS is non-empty if and only if wF < ρ(1 − ψ).
Figure 1 First choice sets.
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Intuitively,WS is non-empty if the formal wage rate wF is not too large. To explain why
WF is non-empty, we note that the worker in the top left-hand corner of Figure 1 will
always choose formal employment for any wF > 0. To see this, note that for this worker
we have vS = (1 − ψ)u (1), and hence vF/vS = (wF)1−γ /(1 − ψ). As γ −→ 1 we must
have vF > vS, for vF/vS approaches 1/(1 − ψ) > 1 for any positive value of wF .
Before analyzing how the labour market operates in the presence of a fixed wage wF , we
specify the condition under which wF exceeds the wage w∗F that would clear the market
with all first preferences being attained. From (3), w∗F is given by
w∗F = AF −
∣∣WF(w∗F)∣∣ .
To ensure that wF > w∗F , we must limit the demand intercept for formal labour, relative
to the fixed formal wage rate wF . Thus, we assume that the following condition holds:
Lemma 2. If AF < |WF (wF)| + wF then there exists a unique wage w∗F ∈ (0,wF) such
that LdF = |WF | .
Given that wF > w∗F , there is an excess supply of formal labour. To determine the equi-
librium that then obtains we must specify a rationing scheme for formal jobs. Although
we have assumed that (log) ability α only has a direct effect on income in self employ-
ment, all formal employees having the same income wF , it may be supposed that some of
the qualities that can make a worker successful in self employment, such as the ability to
acquire relevant information and use initiative, may be conducive to seeking and obtain-
ing jobs in a tight formal labour market. We therefore assume that the rationing scheme
operates on the basis of ability: among those whose first preference is formal employment,
the jobs go to those with the highest ability.
Writing a superscript r to denote that this rationing scheme is in operation, the set of
formal workers is then given by
WrF : vF > max (vI , vS) and α > α̂,
where α̂ satisfies
AF − wF =
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣ (11)
and
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∫ 1
0
∫ min(g(γ ),α)
α̂
f (α, γ ) dα dγ if α̂ < g(0);∫ 1
g−1 (̂α)
∫ min(g(γ ),α)
α̂
f (α, γ ) dα dγ if α̂ > g(0).
(12)
Note that if we were to allow wF = w∗F , then α̂ = 0; but by asserting that wF > w∗F ,
it must be that α̂ > 0. For a worker to be a member of the set WrF it is necessary that
formal employment be their first preference and that their (log) ability is above the critical
level α̂ that is required for success in the formal job market. α̂ is determined so as to
satisfy formal labour demand at wage wF . The first line of (12) applies if the critical value
α̂ < g(0), the value of α at which a risk-neutral worker would be indifferent between F
and S. In this case workers with α > α̂ who are risk averse would also prefer F to S. If,
however, α̂ > g(0), it must also be taken into account that workers for whom α > α̂, but
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whose level of risk aversion γ is below the critical level g−1(̂α), would choose S rather
than F . This is represented in the second line of (12).
2.3.2 Second preferences
Those workers who are rationed out of formal employment choose between infor-
mal employment and self employment. According to their choices between these two
alternatives, we define the respective sets
WiI : vF > vI > vS and α < α̂; (13)
WiS : vF > vS > vI and α < α̂. (14)
We denote the setWiS as ‘involuntarily’ self employed, to distinguish it from the setWS
defined in (7), which we shall henceforth refer to as the ‘voluntarily’ self employed. The
set WiI of workers in informal wage employment is also ‘involuntary’, but, for brevity we
omit this term because all informal wage workers in the model are involuntary.
The borderline values of parameters underlying (13) and (14) are given by
vS ≷ vI ⇔ α ≷ h(γ ),
where
h(γ ) = logwI − log(1 − ψ) − log(1 − φ)1 − γ .
Given the rationing scheme, we then obtain the proportions of the labour force in sets
WiI andWiS:
∣∣WiS∣∣ =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∫ h−1 (̂α)
0
∫ min(g(γ ),̂α)
max(0,h(γ ))
f (α, γ ) dα dγ if α̂ > h(0);
0 if α̂ < h(0);∣∣WiI ∣∣ = 1 − |WS| − ∣∣WrF ∣∣− ∣∣WiS∣∣ .
Of workers for whom α < α̂, those with a combination of relatively high (log) ability
and low risk aversion belong to setWiS, choosing involuntary self-employment; but if the
value of α at the borderline between the two options here is greater than α̂ then there
is no involuntary self employment. The set of workers WiI who choose informal wage
employment follows as a residual.
For a given value of the endogenously determined wage rate wI , the preferences of a
worker with any characteristics (α, γ ) are shown in our first proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider worker iαγ with characteristics (α, γ ). Then iαγ ∈ WrF if α <
g(γ ) and α > α̂; iαγ ∈ WS if α > g(γ ); iαγ ∈ WiI if α < h(γ ) and α < α̂; and iαγ ∈ WiS if
α > h(γ ), α < g(γ ) and α < α̂.
The preferences are illustrated in Figure 2. Here, it is assumed that Lemma 1 holds, so
that WS is non-empty, and that the following lemma holds, to ensure that the other sets
shown are non-empty.7
Lemma 3. WiI is always non-empty; WrF is non-empty if α̂ < α; WiS is non-empty if
h (0) < α̂.
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Figure 2 Labour supply allocation.
Workers with log ability greater than α̂ divide between self employment and formal
wage employment in a manner similar to that shown in Figure 1, and the explanation
of the slope and curvature of the line dividing WS from WrF is the same as that given
with respect to Figure 1. However, workers with log ability less than α̂ do not obtain for-
mal employment. Of this group, those with a combination of relatively low risk aversion
and relatively high ability may choose self employment voluntarily. The remaining work-
ers are rationed out of formal wage employment. Their preferences between involuntary
self employment and informal wage employment reflect the same trade-offs and have the
same intuitive explanation as we have already discussed in terms of Figure 1 for first pref-
erences between self employment and formal wage employment. Hence, the explanation
of whyWiI is non-empty is analogous to the earlier explanation of whyWF is non-empty.
Workers with sufficiently low ability may get informal wage jobs irrespective of their risk
attitude; but those with a combination of sufficiently low risk aversion and high ability
may become (involuntary) self employed.
3 Equilibrium
We now examine the equilibrium in the model. We begin by specifying a condition on
parameter values for which, given that wF > w∗F , a market-clearing informal wage wI =
w∗I below the formal wage wF exists.
Proposition 2. If AI < (1 − φd)wF +
∣∣WiI (wF)∣∣ then there exists a unique wage w∗I ∈
(0,wF) such that LdI =
∣∣WiI ∣∣ .
The intercept on the informal labour demand curve must not be too high – for oth-
erwise the condition that wI < wF would be violated. Similarly, the condition imposes
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a lower bound on wF , while the probability φd that an informal employer will renege on
paying the wage must not be too high.
Given that the condition in Proposition 2 holds, we can interpret the wage wI under-
lying Figure 2 as the equilibrium wage w∗I , so that the figure represents the equilibrium.
The comparative statics of the model, to which we now turn, can be understood intu-
itively by reference to the figure. We are primarily interested in the effect of variations of
parameter values on the size and membership of the sets shown in the figure; but most of
these effects work through their impacts on two endogenous variables, the cut-off value
α = α̂ of log ability and the informal wage rate wI . We therefore begin by specifying the
comparative statics of these variables.
The parameters wF , φc and φd may be interpreted as, at least to some extent, policy
variables. wF may be interpreted as a minimum wage rate imposed by the government.
φc is the probability that informal wages will be confiscated by the government, and this
can be increased by greater effort in detection or a greater willingness to confiscate once
detected. φd is the probability that the employer will choose not to pay the informal
wage. The government may be able to reduce this by strengthening contract enforcement
of wage payment to informal workers. The parameters AF and α¯ may be interpreted as
indicators of economic development. AF is the intercept of the demand curve for for-
mal wage labour, and we may assume that the demand for the goods produced by formal
wage labour increases as the economy grows. α¯ is the upper bound of log ability. An
increase in α¯ can be interpreted as a rise in the average level of ability in the economy. The
remaining parameters, ψ and AI are less easily interpreted as policy tools or indicators of
development.
Lemma 4. In equilibrium, the comparative statics of the log ability cut-off α̂ and the
informal wage rate wI are given by
Log ability cut-off
dα̂
dAF
< 0; dα̂dwF
> 0; dα̂dψ > 0;
dα̂
dα¯ ≷ 0;
dα̂
dAI
= dα̂dφ = 0;
Informal wage rate
dwI
dAF
> 0; dwIdwF
< 0; dwIdψ < 0;
dwI
dα ≷ 0;
dwI
dAI
> 0; dwIdφd
>
dwI
dφc
> 0.
A higher demand for formal wage labour, as represented by AF , is associated with a
lower cut-off log ability α̂, while a higher formal wage rate wF is associated with a higher
cut-off ability. A higher value of ψ represents a greater risk in self employment. At the
margin, this causes the first preference of some voluntarily self employed workers to
change to formal employment. The existence of relatively high ability among this group
pushes up the cut-off value α̂ at which the available formal jobs are filled. The demand for
informal wage workers and income risk in informal wage employment have no impact on
the formal employment decision. Although we shall be able to say something below about
the effects of varying α¯, we are not able to sign dα̂/dα¯ (or dwI/dα¯).
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A higher demand for formal wage labour exerts upward pressure on the informal wage,
whereas a higher formal wage has the opposite effect on the informal wage because it
reduces formal labour demand. Greater risk in self employment causes a substitution
effect from involuntary self employment to informal wage employment, with a negative
impact on wI . A higher demand for informal labour is associated with a higher wage wI .
Greater risk in informal wage employment causes a substitution of informal wage work-
ers into involuntary self employment, exerting a positive impact on wI . However, this
impact is greater for φd than for φc: a marginal increase in the risk that the employer will
renege on payment has a greater effect than the same marginal increase in the risk that
the government will prevent both the worker and the employer from receiving informal
income. Both of these increases in risk make informal wage employment less attractive to
the worker, reducing informal labour supply and therefore increasing wI . But, as we have
explained, the latter effect has no effect on labour demand, whereas the former increases
labour demand, and so pushes wI up further.
Using Lemma 4 and a standard stability condition on the relative slopes of labour
demand and supply, we obtain the comparative statics of employment.
Proposition 3. In a stable equilibrium, the comparative statics of employment in each
occupation are:
Voluntary self employment
d |WS|
dψ < 0;
d |WS|
dα > 0;
d |WS|
dwF
< 0;
d |WS|
dAF
=d |WS|dAI =
d |WS|
dφ = 0;
Formal wage employment
d
∣∣WrF ∣∣
dAF
= 1; d
∣∣WrF ∣∣
dwF
= −1;
d |WS|
dAF
=d |WS|dAI =
d |WS|
dφ =
d |WS|
dψ =
d |WS|
dα = 0;
Informal wage employment
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dAF
< 0;
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dAI
> 0;
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dφc
< 0;
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dφd
> 0;
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dψ > 0;
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dα ≷ 0 ⇔
dwI
dα ≶ 0;
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dwF
> 0;
Involuntary self employment
d
∣∣WiS∣∣
dAF
≷0 ⇔ d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dAF
≶ −1; d
∣∣WiS∣∣
dAI
< 0;
d
∣∣WiS∣∣
dφc
> 0;
d
∣∣WiS∣∣
dφd
<0;
d
∣∣WiS∣∣
dψ ≷ 0 ⇔
∣∣∣∣d |WS|dψ
∣∣∣∣ ≷ d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dψ ;
d
∣∣WiS∣∣
dα ≷ 0;
d
∣∣WiS∣∣
dwF
≷0 ⇔ d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dwF
≶ 1 − d |WS|dwF .
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As we might expect, voluntary self employment |WS| is decreasing in the riskiness ψ
of self employment income and in the formal wage rate wF , but increasing in the average
ability level in the labour force, as represented by α, while formal wage employment
∣∣WrF ∣∣
is increasing in the demand for formal labour, as given by the intercept AF , and decreas-
ing in wF . More interesting results are obtained, however, for the other two employment
types.
Informal wage employment
∣∣WiI ∣∣ is decreasing in the demand for formal labour, and it is
increasing in the demand for informal wage labour and in the riskiness ψ of self employ-
ment. Also, because a higher wF reduces
∣∣WrF ∣∣, ∣∣WiI ∣∣ is increasing in wF . However, greater
risk ψ of not being paid an informal wage can affect
∣∣WiI ∣∣ in either direction, depending
on the source of the risk. A higher risk φc that the government will confiscate the infor-
mal earnings of both the employer and employees in an informal firm results in a smaller∣∣WiI ∣∣. But when the higher risk is in the form φd – that an employer is more likely to renege
on payment – a greater
∣∣WiI ∣∣ results. This is because an increase in φd both depresses the
informal wage, and increases the demand for informal wage labour by making it more
elastic. The two effects conflict, but, assuming a stable market equilibrium in the infor-
mal labour market, the latter effect dominates. This suggests that the strengthening of
detection by the authorities of informal wage work, but improvement of the contractual
rights of informal workers to be paid their wages, would lead to a reduction in the amount
of informal wage work. Finally, a higher level of average ability, as given by α, affects∣∣WiI ∣∣ with the opposite sign to its effect on the informal wage wI – but this effect can
go in either direction. Thus, an economy that is more developed in this sense may have
more informal wage work. It is possible to show that dwi/dα is positive for sufficiently
large α and negative for α sufficiently small. So, for small α, informal wage employment
is increasing in the average level of ability, but this relationship reverses at higher levels
of α.
Although involuntary self employment
∣∣WiS∣∣ is found to be decreasing in the demand
for informal wage labour, as represented by AI , it may be increasing or decreasing
in the demand for formal labour, AF . This is because a rise in AF reduces the pro-
portion of workers who do not achieve their first choice, but also depresses wI . If
the latter effect is sufficiently small, involuntary self employment is increasing in AF .
Thus, if economic development is associated with a greater demand for the output
of formal wage work, it may be found that it is also associated with more involun-
tary self employment. Similarly, the effect on
∣∣WiS∣∣ of a higher wF can be of either
sign. Also, the effects on
∣∣WiS∣∣ of greater risk are not clear-cut. Greater risk ψ with
respect to the earnings of the self employed can affect
∣∣WiS∣∣ in either direction: there
is a direct effect, discouraging involuntary self employment, but there is also an indi-
rect effect which, by discouraging voluntary self employment, increases the supply of
workers to involuntary self employment (and informal wage employment). The net
effect can go either way, the underlying condition being that specified in the propo-
sition. For similar reasons, a higher level of average ability, as represented by α can
affect
∣∣WiS∣∣ in either direction. The effect on ∣∣WiS∣∣ of an increase in the risks, φc and
φd, associated with informal wage employment is the opposite in sign to the effect of
these risks on informal wage employment. But, since d |WS| /dφ = d
∣∣WrF ∣∣ /dφ = 0,
variation of
∣∣WiS∣∣ in this case is exactly compensated by variation of the opposite sign
in
∣∣WiI ∣∣.
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4 Conclusions
We formulate a model of an urban labour market in a developing economy in which work-
ers’ risk attitudes play a role in determining their labour supply decisions and we illustrate
the model diagrammatically. Whereas in the Rauch (1991) model risk is excluded, with
choices being made purely on the basis of ability, in our formulation trade-offs between
ability and risk aversion matter. For example, when risk is excluded from the analysis a
worker’s first preference might be self employment (maximizing expected income); but,
incorporating risk into the model, given that self employment income is uncertain, the
worker’s risk aversion may be sufficient to make him or her prefer formal wage employ-
ment. Similarly, the results of the search-and-matching literature on informality would be
modified if risk aversion were taken into account. For example, in the model of Albrecht
et al. (2009) workers who are relatively productive in formal-sector employment reject
informal job offers to wait for a formal-sector job. But if risk aversion were allowed for,
these workers might not take the risk of rejecting the informal job offer. Parallel to our
analysis, it is therefore possible that a worker with higher ability would take an informal
job, while a worker with lower ability would get a formal job.
Among our results is that a greater risk that an informal wage worker will not be paid
can affect total informal wage employment in either direction, depending on the source of
the risk. It is found that if the government wishes to reduce the amount of informal wage
work, it may do so by strengthening detection efforts by the authorities of informal wage
work, or by improving the contractual rights of informal wage workers to be paid. The
latter policy discourages informal employers from offering so many jobs. But this policy
would have no effect on formal wage employment or voluntary self employment – the
reduction in informal wage employment would be exactly compensated by an increase
in involuntary self employment. We also find that if the average level of ability is used
as a development indicator, informal wage employment at first rises and then falls as the
economy develops. If, alternatively, the demand for formal production (and thus labour)
is used as a development indicator, development can be associated with more involuntary
self employment.
Our analysis indicates some relatively complex relationships between risk attitudes and
labour allocation. In Figure 2 it can be seen that, among the voluntary self employed,
higher ability is, on average, associated with greater risk aversion. The same observation
can be made for the involuntarily self employed. However, if we consider the whole group
of self employed – voluntary plus involuntary – the monotonic relationship disappears.
The ability level at which risk aversion is, on average, smallest, is at the cut-off level of
ability for formal wage employment. Also, looking horizontally up the diagram, it can be
seen that, for relatively low and relatively high levels of risk aversion, movements between
types of employment are monotonic as ability rises. However, at an intermediate level
of risk aversion, increasing ability is associated with a shift from informal wage employ-
ment to (involuntary) self employment and on to wage employment, but then back to
self employment (which is voluntary in this case). This is consistent with the findings of
Perry et al. (2007), who observe young workers often take informal wage employment to
develop their skills andmaymove into formal wage work, but eventually utilize their skills
in voluntary self employment.
Our formulation might be developed in various directions, including a full modelling
of the demand side of the labour market. This might include consideration of whether
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the outputs of the informal and formal wage sectors are substitutable. Allowance might
also be made for ability to affect labour productivity in formal wage jobs, and it would be
interesting to examine how the results are affected if the rationing scheme for formal wage
jobs were changed, for example by supposing that jobs are allocated among applicants
randomly.
5 Appendix
Lemma 1. First consider a worker with characteristics (ρ, γ ) = (1, 1 − ε) where ε > 0.
Then, since wF > 0, vF/vS = (wF)ε/(1−ψ) −→ 1/(1−ψ) as ε −→ 0. Therefore, asψ > 0,
we have that 1/(1−ψ) > 1. Hence, by continuity, there exists an ε sufficiently close to zero
such that vF/vS > 1, so that WF = ∅. Second, consider the circumstances under which
vF < vS for an agent with characteristics (ρ, γ ). vF < vS if and only if (wF)1−γ /(1 − γ ) <
(1 − ψ)ρ1−γ /(1 − γ ) ⇐⇒ wF/ρ < (1 − ψ)1/1−γ < 0. The function wF/ρ is decreasing
in ρ and, since 1 − ψ < 1, the function (1 − ψ)1/1−γ is decreasing in γ . Therefore if
wF/ρ¯ > 1 − ψ it must be that wF/ρ > (1 − ψ)1/1−γ for all 1 < ρ < ρ and 0 < γ < 1;
i.e., WS = ∅. Thus, WS = ∅ if and only if wF < ρ(1 − ψ).
Lemma 2. Let w denote a candidate wage in the formal sector. First suppose that w = 0;
then LdF = AF > 0. It follows that |WF | = 0 since vS > vF = 0. Hence LdF > |WF | if w = 0.
Next suppose that w = wF , in which case LdF = AF − wF. So if AF < |WF (wF)| + wF
then LdF < |WF |. Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there must exist w∗F ∈ (0,wF)
such that LdF = |WF |. Since LdF is linear and ∂|WF |∂wF = 1α
∫ g−1(α)
ζ
∂g
∂wF dγ > 0 (where ζ = 0 if
g(0)  0 and g−1 (0) if g(0) < 0) w∗F is unique.
Proposition 1. First note that if wF > wI then g(γ ) > h(γ ) for all γ ∈[ 0, 1) and vF > vI .
Firstly consider under what conditions a worker will enter formal employment, i.e. iαγ ∈
WrF ⇐⇒ vF > max (vI , vS) and α > α̂. This is satisfied if and only if α < g(γ ) and α > α̂.
Next consider when self-employment would be a worker’s first choice, i.e. iαγ ∈ WS ⇐⇒
vS > max (vF , vI) ⇐⇒ α > g(γ ). The condition α > g(γ ) is sufficient, for the condition
α > h(γ ) that guarantees vS > vI is implied by α > g(γ ). Now consider a worker’s
second choice if they are unable to attain their first preference of formal employment. The
conditions for a worker to enter informal employment are iαγ ∈ WiI ⇐⇒ α < h(γ ) and
α < α̂. This is true since vI > vS ⇐⇒ α < h(γ ). The conditions for a worker to enter
self-employment are iαγ ∈ WiS ⇐⇒ vF > vS > vI and α < α̂. This holds if and only if
h(γ ) < α < g(γ ) and α < α̂.
Lemma 3. Consider a worker iργ with characteristics (ρ, γ ) = (1, 1 − ε) where ε > 0.
We now find the conditions under which iργ ∈ WiI using the inequalities in (13). First,
from (2), vF > vI ⇐⇒ (wF)ε > (1 − φ)(wI)ε . Then, since limε−→0(wF)ε = 1 and
limε−→0(1−φ)(wI)ε = (1−φ), there must exist ε1 such that vF > vI for all ε < ε1. Second,
using (2) we have vI > vS ⇐⇒ (1− φ)(wI)ε > (1− ψ). Since ψ > φ then there will exist
ε2 such that for all ε < ε2, vI > vS. Therefore, since 0 < α̂, iργ ∈ WiI for ε < min(ε1, ε2),
i.e. WiI = ∅. Next consider a worker with characteristics (ρ, γ ) = (ρ̂, 1 − ε) where ε > 0.
As above, vF > vI . Then, since limε−→0(wF)ε = limε−→0(ρ̂)ε = 1 and (1 − ψ) < 1, there
must exist ε > 0 such that vF > vS. Hence, if α̂ < α, then iργ ∈ WrF and WrF = ∅.
Last, consider a worker with characteristics (ρ, γ ) = (ρ̂, 1 − ε), where ρ̂ = eα̂ . Then
Bennett et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development 2012, 1:5 Page 14 of 17
http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/5
there exists ε > 0 such that (1 − φ)(wI)ε > (1 − ψ)ρ̂ε , i.e., such that vI > vS. For a
worker with (ρ, γ ) = (ρ̂, 0) then vS > vI ⇐⇒ wI(1 − φ) < ρ̂(1 − ψ). Therefore,
if wI(1 − φ) < ρ̂(1 − ψ), which is equivalent to h (0) < α̂, by the intermediate value
theorem, there must exist 0 < γ˜ < 1 such that h(γ˜ ) = α̂. We know that h(γ ) < g(γ ) and
vF > vS ⇐⇒ α < g(γ ), hence α̂ = h(γ˜ ) < g(γ˜ ). Therefore, there must exist η,μ > 0
such that a worker with (ρ, γ ) = (ρ̂ − η, γ˜ − μ) satisfies vF > vS > vI . That is WiS = ∅.
Proposition 2. Let w denote a candidate informal wage. First suppose that w = 0, then
LdI = AI > 0.
∣∣WiI ∣∣ = 0 since vI = 0 and vS > 0. Hence LdI > ∣∣WiI ∣∣. Next, suppose that
w = wF, in which case LdI = AI − (1 − φd)wF. So, if AI < (1 − φd)wF +
∣∣WiI (wF)∣∣, then
LdI <
∣∣WiI ∣∣ for w = wF. Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, there must exist
w∗I ∈ (0,wF) such that LdI =
∣∣WiI ∣∣. Since LdI is linear and ∂∣∣WiI ∣∣∂wF = 1α ∫ g−1 (̂α)ζ ∂h∂wI dγ > 0
(where ζ = 0 if h(0)  0 and h−1 (0) if h(0) < 0) the equilibrium is unique.
Lemma 4. From (9) the derivatives of g (·) satisfy gψ > 0 and gwF > 0, with the
remaining derivatives being zero. The derivatives of g−1 (·) satisfy g−1wF < 0, g−1α > 0, and
g−1ψ ≷ 0 ⇔ logwF ≷ α. As we encounter g−1ψ only when logwF < α, we have g−1ψ < 0.
Using these results to differentiate
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣ in (12) we obtain
∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂α̂
=
{
g−1 (̂α)−1
α
< 0 if α̂ > g(0);
− 1
α
< 0 if α̂ < g(0);
∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂α
=
⎧⎨⎩− 1α2
∫ g−1(α)
g−1 (̂α) g(γ ) dγ − α̂α2 g−1(̂α) + α̂α2 ≷ 0 if α̂ > g(0);
− 1
α2
∫ g−1(α)
0 g(γ ) dγ + α̂α2 ≷ 0 if α̂ < g(0);
∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂ψ
=
{ 1
αwF
(
g−1(α) − g−1(̂α)) > 0 if α̂ > g(0);
g−1(α)
αwF > 0 if α̂ < g(0);
∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂wF
=
{ 1
αwF
(
g−1(α) − g−1(̂α)) > 0 if α̂ > g(0);
g−1(α)
αwF > 0 if α̂ < g(0);
∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂AF
= ∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂AI
= ∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂φ
= 0.
Hence, total differentiation of (11) yields
dα̂
dAF
=
(
∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂α̂
)−1
< 0;
dα̂
dψ = −
∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂ψ
(
∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂α̂
)−1
> 0;
dα̂
dwF
= −
(
1 + ∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂wF
)(
∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂α̂
)−1
> 0;
dα̂
dα = −
∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂α
(
∂
∣∣WrF (̂α)∣∣
∂α̂
)−1
≷ 0;
dα̂
dAI
=dα̂dφ = 0.
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We proceed in the same manner for the comparative statics of wI . We have hφ < 0,
hψ > 0 and h−1φ > 0, h
−1
ψ < 0. Differentiation of
∣∣WiI ∣∣ yields:
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂AF
= 1
α
∂α̂
∂AF
(
1 − h−1(̂α)) < 0;
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂φ
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
− 1
α
∫ h−1 (̂α)
0
∂h
∂φ
dγ < 0 if h(0)  0;
− 1
α
∫ h−1 (̂α)
h−1(0)
∂h
∂φ
dγ < 0 if h(0) < 0;
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂ψ
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
α
∫ h−1 (̂α)
0
∂h
∂ψ
dγ + 1
α
∂α̂
∂ψ
(
1 − h−1(̂α)) > 0 if h(0)  0;
1
α
∫ h−1 (̂α)
h−1(0)
∂h
∂ψ
dγ + 1
α
∂α̂
∂ψ
(
1 − h−1(̂α)) > 0 if h(0) < 0;
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂α
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
−1
α2
∫ h−1 (̂α)
0 h(γ ) dγ +
(
1
α
∂α̂
∂α
− α̂
α2
) (
1 − h−1(̂α)) ≷ 0 if h(0)  0;
−1
α2
∫ h−1 (̂α)
h−1(0) h(γ ) dγ +
(
1
α
∂α̂
∂α
− α̂
α2
) (
1 − h−1(̂α)) ≷ 0 if h(0) < 0;
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂wF
= 1
α
∂α̂
∂wF
(
1 − h−1(̂α)) > 0;
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂AI
= 0.
Hence, total differentiation of the expression
∣∣WiI ∣∣− LdI = 0 yields
dwI
dAF
= −
(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂AF
)/(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂wI
− ∂L
d
I
∂wI
)
> 0;
dwI
dAI
= −
(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂AI
− 1
)/(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂wI
− ∂L
d
I
∂wI
)
> 0;
dwI
dφc
= −
(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂φc
)/(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂wI
− ∂L
d
I
∂wI
)
> 0;
dwI
dφd
=dwIdφc +
{
wI
/(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂wI
− ∂L
d
I
∂wI
)}
>
dwI
dφc
;
dwI
dψ = −
(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂ψ
)/(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂wI
− ∂L
d
I
∂wI
)
< 0;
dwI
dα = −
(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂α
)/(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂wI
− ∂L
d
I
∂wI
)
≷ 0;
dwI
dwF
= −
(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂wF
)/(
∂
∣∣WiI ∣∣
∂wI
− ∂L
d
I
∂wI
)
< 0.
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Proposition 3. Using (10), the comparative statics of |WS| are determined as:
d |WS|
dψ =
⎧⎨⎩−
1
α
∫ g−1(α)
0
∂g(γ )
∂ψ
dγ < 0 if g(0)  0;
− 1
α
∫ g−1(α)
g−1(0)
∂g(γ )
∂ψ
dγ < 0 if g(0) < 0;
d |WS|
dα =
⎧⎨⎩ 1α2
∫ g−1(α)
0 g(γ ) dγ > 0 if g(0)  0;
1
α2
∫ g−1(α)
g−1(0) g(γ ) dγ > 0 if g(0) < 0;
d |WS|
dwF
=
⎧⎨⎩−
1
α
∫ g−1(α)
0
∂g(γ )
∂ψ
dγ < 0 if g(0)  0;
− 1
α
∫ g−1(α)
g−1(0)
∂g(γ )
∂ψ
dγ < 0 if g(0) < 0;
d |WS|
dAF
= d |WS|dAI =
d |WS|
dφ = 0.
The comparative statics for
∣∣WrF ∣∣ are determined trivially from differentiation of the right
side of (11). The comparative statics of
∣∣WiI ∣∣ are determined by differentiating informal
labour demand in (4). We then obtain
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dAF
= − (1 − φd) dwIdAF < 0;
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dAI
= 1 − (1 − φd) dwIdAI < 0;
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dφc
= − (1 − φd) dwIdφc < 0;
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dφd
= − (1 − φd) dwIdφd + wI > 0;
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dψ = − (1 − φd)
dwI
dψ > 0;
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dα = − (1 − φd)
dwI
dα ≷ 0 ⇔
dwI
dα ≶ 0;
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣
dwF
= − (1 − φd) dwIdwF > 0;
where stability of the equilibrium in the informal labour market, i.e. d
∣∣WiI ∣∣ /dwI >
dLdI /dwI , implies dwI/dAI < 1 − φd and dwI/dφd < wI/ (1 − φd). Last, we obtain the
comparative statics of |WS| by noting that, for any exogenous variable x, it must hold that
d
∣∣WiI ∣∣ /dx = − (d |WS| /dx + d ∣∣WiI ∣∣ /dx + d ∣∣WrF ∣∣ /dx).
6 Endnotes
1Fortin et al. (1997) is an exception: the Rauch-Lucas model is adapted to include a prob-
ability of less than unity of finding a formal job and workers are assumed risk averse.
Specific results are generated by incorporating this formulation into a CGE model for
Senegal. See Bennett (2011) for a recent contribution and references to literature that
develops Rauch’s formulation.
2Whereas we assume that informal employers may renege on paying the endogenously-
determined informal wage, Basu et al. (2010) analyse the case of possible non-compliance
by (formal) employers with a minimum wage law. In their analysis the government
chooses the intensity of enforcement, and so compliance decisions by heterogenous
employers are made endogenously. Our analysis is simpler in that the probability that an
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employer will renege is assumed the same for all workers and is given exogenously. How-
ever, the Basu et al. model does not allow for risk aversion.
3See Kanbur (2009) on the meanings and definition of informality.
4A recent paper by Bennett and Rablen (2012) uses a similar approach to model voluntary
and involuntary labour market states, also incorporating endogenous labour demand, but
no allowance is made for risk.
5We choose a simple formulation of the utility function for tractability. Other simple spec-
ifications such as constant absolute risk aversion or mean-variance utility can instead be
used and yield similar results. However, the assumption of constant relative risk aversion
has stronger empirical support (Wakker 2008).
6The case shown here is illustrative. It is also feasible that this line will start at a point on
the γ -axis (though it will still have the slope and curvature shown).
7Lemmas 1 and 3 specify restrictions on parameter values so that each of the employ-
ment states that the model covers obtain simultaneously, as is observed in developing
economies. Without Lemma 3, for example, the return to self employment might be so
high that neither type of wage labour would exist in equilibrium.
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